



## *The President's Daily Brief*

*1 December 1971*

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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Indian and Pakistani officials are expressing still more pessimism on the chances for peace, Prime Minister Gandhi delivered a particularly tough speech to parliament yesterday, and Peking has issued its strongest accusations against India in the current phase of the crisis. (Page 1)

In Cambodia, Communist troops are pressing hard against the government's Chenla II force along Route 6 and the situation has been declared critical. (Page 3)

On Page 4 we discuss some implications of last Sunday's elections in Uruguay.

At Annex, we examine the current status of the Cyprus dispute, especially the disturbing effect caused by General Grivas' presence on the island.

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## INDIA-PAKISTAN

Both Indian and Pakistani officials are expressing growing pessimism on the chances for peace. Ambassador Keating describes the Pakistani high commissioner in New Delhi as "resigned" to the likelihood of war. The Indian ambassador to Afghanistan yesterday told US Embassy officers in Kabul that he anticipated hostilities within one week. In Karachi, the Indian deputy high commissioner, previously an optimist on the likelihood of avoiding war, expressed the opinion that a full-scale conflict could erupt at any time. Apparently in line with this thinking, virtually all dependents of Indian officials in Karachi have left by air for New Delhi since last Sunday.


Prime Minister Gandhi told the upper house of parliament yesterday that the presence of West Pakistani troops in East Pakistan constitutes a threat to India's security. She warned that India would not stand by while Bengalis in East Pakistan were "annihilated."

*These tough statements further escalate India's pressure on Islamabad into either accepting a political settlement or initiating full-scale war with its more powerful neighbor. Mrs. Gandhi also may be setting the stage for a still more active role for the Indian armed forces in support of the guerrilla offensive in East Pakistan.*

The Bangla Desh radio has broadcast the longest and most vitriolic attack on the US Government in some time. Washington is charged with attempting to destroy the unity between the Bangla Desh regime and the guerrilla forces and seeking to "internationalize" an internal Pakistani crisis so as to give President Yahya a chance to recoup his dwindling strength.

*The radio attacks conceivably could lead to guerrilla action against US personnel or facilities in East Pakistan although, as in the past, the broadcast tended to differentiate between the government and people of the US.*

Chinese Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on Monday voiced Peking's strongest and most authoritative accusation against India in the current phase of the crisis, but again made evident China's desire



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for a political settlement. Li accused India of carrying out subversive activities and military provocations as well as invading and occupying Pakistani territory. Li lashed out at the USSR indirectly, accusing it of supporting and encouraging the Indians, but his criticisms did not match those delivered last Friday at the UN by Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, who called the Indo-Soviet treaty signed last August essentially a military alliance, adding that it had led to "bare-faced aggression against Pakistan."

*Despite this step-up in Peking's public expressions of concern, these harsh words do not show any change in China's basic policy of maintaining cautious political and military assistance to the Pakistan Government, while urging it to work as rapidly as possible toward a political settlement within East Pakistan and with India.*

In New York, the president of the UN Security Council has circulated to Council members Yahya's letter to Secretary General Thant requesting that UN observers be sent to the Pakistani side of the East Pakistan borders. Thant commented that the matter was beyond his competence and should come before the Security Council under the terms of the UN charter.

*Thant's conception of a limited mandate for himself and the need for a formal decision by the Security Council in order to dispatch UN observers kills any immediate prospect that a mission will be sent. Yahya's appeal will remain in limbo unless some member formally requests a Council meeting to deal with the question.*


The military situation has not changed significantly. Clashes continue near Jessore, and New Delhi admits that Indian troops are still involved in the fighting inside East Pakistan near Hilli. To the north, a battle appears to be continuing near Pachagarh--which the Pakistani Army has abandoned under pressure--and other clashes are occurring near Kamalpur in Mymensingh District, inside the northern border of Sylhet District, and along the eastern border of East Pakistan in the Belonia salient.

The border between India and West Pakistan remains generally quiet.

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## CAMBODIA: Route 6 Area



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## CAMBODIA

Communist troops have surrounded some of the government's Chenla II units near Kompong Thmar, the logistics base for the operation's northern force

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South of the town, the Communists have captured a portion of Route 6 and isolated the government base at Baray, where heavy fighting now appears to have broken out. In addition, US aerial observers have reported that there is fighting along Route 21 south-east of Kompong Thmar and that some retreating government troops have abandoned weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. This morning the US defense attaché reported that the Chenla II situation had been declared "critical," with the Communists now occupying three portions of Route 6.

*In resuming the offensive in the area, the Communists may be trying to take advantage of the fact that almost 20 battalions of government troops, including several elite Khmer Krom units, have been diverted to the defense of Phnom Penh. Although there are still about 22,000 government troops in the Chenla II force, those in the northern part remain cut off and dependent on aerial resupply. The government had planned to build a series of strongpoints along the road, but will probably be unable to hold such positions if the Communists keep up the pressure.*

*Since two regiments of the Vietnamese Communist 9th Division--the 95C and 271st regiments--have moved north into the Kompong Thmar area since the South Vietnamese began their offensive east of the Mekong, it seems unlikely that the Communists will be quickly drawn away from the Route 6 area by South Vietnamese operations. Continued Communist attacks on the Chenla II forces may prompt Phnom Penh to ask that South Vietnamese troops be sent to operate west of the Mekong, as they did last year at this time.*

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## URUGUAY

With reporting from some rural districts still incomplete and a substantial absentee vote in Sunday's general elections uncounted, the incumbent Colorado Party is maintaining a precarious lead over the Blanco Party. Under Uruguay's complex election law, if this lead holds the presidency will go to Juan Maria Bordaberry, handpicked choice of President Pacheco. If the Blancos pull ahead, Wilson Ferreira will succeed Pacheco. The Communist-led Frente Amplio coalition nationwide attracted less than 20 percent of the vote, but finished a strong second in the Montevideo mayoralty race with some 30 percent. The final outcome may not be clear for several days, until the 100,000 remaining ballots are counted.

*We expect that Bordaberry would operate much in the Pacheco pattern--championing tough security measures against leftist terrorists, blaming Congress for its refusal to grant him increased police powers, and following conservative economic policies. Ferreira, on the other hand, effectively articulated a platform calling for selected nationalization and land reform, and his approach might lower tensions of recent years by reducing the appeal of the extreme leftist forces. Neither man would have majority support in Congress.*

*With the Congressional representation of the Frente Amplio participants at last somewhat increased, it is in a position to generate additional legislative problems for any new president. Judging by the intra-Frente difficulties encountered during the campaign, however, there is a question whether the Frente will be able to hold together as a coordinated political force for the longer term.*

*Some of the Uruguayan leftists, however, will be receptive to the Tupamaro terrorists' charge that the system is so rigged that a "popular" victory can come only by force of arms. In any event, the Tupamaro operational standdown during the election period could end soon, especially if Bordaberry is confirmed as the winner. Security force operations will also be less restricted than they were in the campaign period, at least until Pacheco leaves office in March.*

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Persian Gulf: Last night Iraq announced it was breaking relations with Britain and Iran because of Iran's occupation of the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs earlier in the day. Otherwise Arab reaction has been limited, despite an exchange of fire on one Tunb that resulted in the death of four and possibly eight local police as well as three Iranians. Iraq and Yemen (Aden) may try to raise the issue in the UN, but most Arab states are preoccupied with other issues.

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## A DECEPTIVE QUIET ON CYPRUS

*Secretary General Thant will formally report today that little progress has been made toward resolution of the intercommunal strife on Cyprus. Later this month the Security Council will consider whether to renew the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force on the island; there are signs that some nations contributing troops to the force are considering dropping out. Although the situation on Cyprus has been remarkably quiet for several months, old animosities remain and threaten again to burst into violence.*

*The presence on Cyprus of General George Grivas has introduced a new air of uncertainty into the situation. Since Grivas arrived clandestinely in early September, there has been a revival of speculation concerning enosis--union of Cyprus with Greece--or double enosis--partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. Speculation in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia about such radical solutions is undercutting efforts to negotiate a settlement.*

*Grivas is a naturalized Greek of Cypriot origin who has made his mark as a leader of guerrilla forces. He led a resistance movement in Greece during World War II and directed the Cypriot struggle against the British from 1955 to 1959. After hostilities again broke out between Turkish and Greek Cypriots in 1964 Grivas organized the Cyprus National Guard, became the supreme commander of the Cyprus Armed Forces, promoted union with Greece, and ultimately became the bête-noir of Archbishop Makarios. Grivas apparently never forgave Makarios for accepting the London-Zurich Agreements of 1959, which made Cyprus an independent republic rather than opening the way for enosis. His difficulties with Makarios prompted numerous threats to resign as commander of the Cypriot Army, but he remained until late 1967, when he was withdrawn by Athens under Turkish pressure. Then, as now, Makarios had no intention of giving up supreme power as head of a sovereign state. He sees no future for himself under enosis--single or double.*

*Both the Turkish Cypriots and the mainland Turks despise Grivas. The Turks believe he was the direct cause of the sacking of a Turkish Cypriot village in 1964 and the death of some 27 Turkish Cypriots there. There are no present indications that Grivas has the large force of old behind him, but his almost legendary role in the turbulent Cypriot problems during the past two decades has raised fears that he will attract a new following in the coming months.*

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Grivas, now 74 years old, is at his best as an elusive and mysterious organizer of guerrilla units. Possibly with the connivance of the Greek Government, he escaped surveillance from his home in Athens in late August, and a few days later arrived secretly on Cyprus to begin testing his support in the villages. As expected, Turkey initially insisted that Makarios and the Greek Government apprehend the General and return him to Athens. When it became apparent that Grivas was more interested in challenging Makarios than in terrorizing the Turkish Cypriots, however, the Turks noticeably softened their objections.

Grivas is forming illegal armed groups. They estimate that Grivas has the necessary weapons to arm a force of 400 to 600 men with mortars and light machine guns. It is also reported that the General could equip a reserve force of 1,000 to 2,000 men with small arms. General Angelis, commander of the Greek Armed Forces, anticipates that Grivas will begin an active phase against Makarios within the next few weeks. Grivas has disguised his moves, however. Although he has not surfaced on the island, rumors about his plans have put Makarios on the defensive. The Archbishop reportedly has been arming his own loyal bands. He has also been removing officials whose loyalty he questions. Thus far, Makarios has forced at least five Greek Cypriot officials to resign. US observers on the island believe that if the Archbishop continues his purge, he will drive others, who would otherwise remain neutral, over to Grivas' side.

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One critical element in Grivas' fortunes is the extent to which the Greek Government will support him. Athens denies any involvement in the affair but has made no effort to inhibit the General's activities and, indeed, seems to be using Greek assets in Cyprus to support him. The Greek-sponsored press and mainland Greek officers on the island have been accused of disseminating pro-Grivas propaganda. Athens' official hands-off attitude in the present circumstances clearly helps Grivas more than Makarios.

Although Grivas' motives are not clear, his past actions provide some insights into his present plans. As an ardent anti-Communist, he is violently opposed to Makarios' dealings with the Communist bloc. The General reacted strongly against the gains the Communist Party of Cyprus made in the July 1970 Cypriot

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elections. He also strongly opposed Makarios' trip to Moscow last spring. Because of Makarios' continuing flirtation with the Communists, several sources believe that Grivas' primary goal now is double enosis. Grivas had always wanted complete union with Greece but now is said to be willing to accept double enosis rather than see a further rise of left-wing influence on the island.

The latest intercommunal meeting between Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives occurred shortly after Grivas arrived on Cyprus. As expected, it failed to break the stalemate of many years over the degree of autonomy for Turkish Cypriots. No further meetings have been scheduled.

Meanwhile, despite considerable discussion, Greek and Turkish foreign ministers have been unable to find a way to resuscitate the intercommunal talks that would be acceptable to all parties. Their activities, however, have stimulated rumors in Nicosia to the effect that Grivas has their support for double enosis. The two foreign ministers have sought the help of Thant, who in turn has been unsuccessful in efforts to interject a UN participant--along with Greek and Turkish constitutional experts--into the intercommunal talks. None of the affected parties is completely satisfied with this proposal, and Makarios' suspicions of Athens and Ankara will probably defeat it.

As the year draws to a close, some of the nations (particularly Canada) contributing troops to the UN peacekeeping force on the island are threatening to withdraw from Cyprus unless the intercommunal talks are resumed. Makarios cannot be counted on to give in to this pressure either. If he does not, however, the situation could easily deteriorate and the Archbishop would run the risk of bringing about what he fears most--an effort by the Greek and Turkish governments to unseat him and divide the island among themselves.

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